Abstract: After some introductory remarks on the German legal system and German legal politics, the main forms of datanet crime on the Internet are sketched. After that, one of the most important Internet-cases of the last decade, the CompuServe case, is discussed in some detail. One of the main problems of datanet crime is its global reach. The world-spanning nature of the cyberspace significantly enlarges the ability of offenders to commit crimes that will affect people in a variety of other countries. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of national criminallaw cannot be expanded at will by any single nation. A transnational criminal law for the Internet is possible but should be restricted to the defence of universally ( or nearly universally) accepted interests and values. In effect, it seems that the problems of computer-related crime on the Inte rnet cannot be solved by crimina llaw alone.
Introduction
The problern of Internet criminality h as recently been the focus of great public attention. Some years ago, a computer virus romantically entitled "I love you", was spread via the Microsoft Outlook programme and ma n aged t o pa ralyse millions of computers world-wide, causing a n estimated darnage of several billion Euro. Indeed , very unique sweet nothings! On t his occasion, h owever , they d id n ot com e from Moscow but from a frustrated IT-student wh o sought t o impress his professor. A few weeks earlier, ma jor compa nies and a uthorities had been impaired or p a ralysed by immen se amounts of electronic messages. H ere too the computer cr ash es caused enormous da m ages. Since then, attacks by m eans of computer viruses and Internet-worms h ave b ecom e more or less a n ormal part of day to da y life.
Obv iously, Internet-criminality h as finally left the a r ea of scien ce fiction and scie ntific sp eculation a nd has materialised into a sever e practical p roblem. This issue also touch es upon asp ects of criminal law, since it is unde r this title that qu estions regarding the conditions for the punishment of Internet criminals a rise. Firstly, I shall make a brief introduction into the laws a nd legal p olitics of the Federal Republic of Germany. This basis is helpful for further regarding the indict ability of Internet c riminals.
Particula rly in Germany, the idea tha t new technologies, such as the Internet , sh ould b e glob ally regula ted by law is quite common. Criminal law is seen as part of legal social control (Krey 2002, 3) . As far as this matter is concerned, the German legal system is relatively advanced in comparison with most other *I tha.nk Mis s Nicol Gates for looking over my English legal systems. The law makers endeavour to protect everybody against any risk and to provide them with a fair legal decision in any single case. The numerous European regulations which are in place seek to pad out the various domestic legal systems within European states.
The German welfare state provides the German people with a high standard of security and social justice. Yet, when considered in comparison to its advantages, a large number of disadvantages of the welfare state become apparent: The surge of new rules over decades has created the problem, that even cases which appear to be simple, pose complex questions of law. In areas such as taxation, social security and telecommunications, even specialists get lost in the jungle of laws and rules. This over-regulation leads to confusion and a lack of prec1s1on.
Critics argue that complete regulation of life leads to losses of freedom. This loss of freedom can be sensed increasingly. Hand in hand, constitutional problems arise in the sense that, since apparently nobody knows all of these regulations, nobody can follow them. In order to try and regulate this chaos, suggestions have been put forward that new laws be initially passed for a limited p eriod only. Their efficien cy should b e r eviewed following expiration of this period. Yet a lasting solution ca n only b e found wh en societ y moves aw ay from the idea of a law m a ker wh o is r esp on sible for ev ery thing and allocat es the indiv idual mor e p ow er in finding solutions to indiv idual problems . A s far as Internet law is concerned, this m eans in prac tical t erms, t h at the law m a ker sh ould not b e called upon for ever y small problem. Instead we must attempt to solve p roble ms by a p p lying existing laws.
In addition, t he re is a growing n eed for private efforts a t crime prevention on the Internet. This m eans p reventive efforts on the p a rt of prosp ective v ictims, as well as the implemen tation of adequate technology on the pa rt of Internet service providers a nd the privat e m onitoring a nd surveilla nce of cyb er sp ace.
Computer-law differ s from m ost other bra nch es of law, as it d oes not fall exclusively unde r public law, civillaw or criminallaw but crosses all t hree bra nch es. It is ther efor e a n ove rla pping subj ect, and as lawyers n ormally only work in one of t h e t hree m ain bra nch es of law, ther e a r e very few wh o d eal w ith IT-law as a w h ole. The computerisation of our life has produced questions in all a reas of law. There are nume rous sp ecial regula tions, ranging from comp uter-c riminal law to the sign ature-statute. In t h e following I willlimit myself t o a sm all section: new forms of crime in the Internet.
The fast world-wide expa nsion of t h e Internet , a nd con sequently the b ordercrossing of data-stream s leave t h e d om estic legal system s of indiv id ual nations facing severe problems. This is most a ppa rent in criminallaw, since, unlike other a reas of law, its r oots a re to b e found in the resp ective nation al cult ure. This is t y pified by the fact tha t a n Internet publication can b e r eceived world-wide; it cannot b e limited to the territor y of a ny on e sta te. It follows that d omestic criminal law is often over ch arged in t rying to counter d a ta n et crime. Presently, inte rnational c riminal law exist s only in the basic form of Public Interna tion al Law. It is t raditionally accepted t hat t h e p ower t o p enalise rem ains sen sitive to national sovereignty and individual states only very reluctantly surrender this power to a superior jurisdiction.
For these reasons it is often said that the sanctioning of datanet crimes is not a national but a global problem, which can only be solved by international agreements. It would be arrogant for a single nation to call itself the 'master of nets'. One should however take this position in its context: The problern of mastering datanet crime constitutes a small section of a much broader range of problems created by global markets. The bearers of such problems are generally national legal systems and national politics. The argument often arises that global processes are simply out of control. Therefore individual states should limit themselves to securing economical frameworks and to correcting excessive severity in single cases. We are here talking about the importance of economics and the end of politics-and therefore about the end of law.
To my mind, this pessimistic attitude is wrong and even dangerous: In a democratic state it is not the economic market but politics which is responsible for finding solutions to questions of social order. Criminal law provides a good means to secure highly regarded legal values. The spreading of datanets does not affect the distribution of legal duties. The opinion, which is often expressed tha t d omestic c riminallaw ca nnot tackle n ew d a ta n et crimes a nd tha t su ccess is only promised by internation al m eans , would bring with it hand in ha nd a severe w eakening of legal protection in favour of the interests of the m a rket. For the sam e reason , t h e idealistic idea of a n Interne t w ithout (c riminal) law is naive.
The discussion concerning p en alties for d a ta n et criminality encounters further hurd les in other areas, su ch as those concerning the highly sp ecialised techn ology involved , combined with the mod ern, sp ecified la nguage, containing a lot of English terms. As t echnology is r apidly d eveloping , the t erminology is also con stantly ch a nging (advert ising copywriters have a la rge infl.uence upon t his). Criminallaw should not have to adapt itself to this ever-changing langu age.
To render the solution s to importa nt d ogmatic questions dependent upon mere technical details, which will soon disappear , also fails to provide us with a conv incing argument. In the n ear future, the usage of da t a ne ts will b ecom e so common tha t technical asp ect s w ill fad e into the backgr ound, just as the case is today w ith telephon e or br oadcasting. The criminal countering of d atanet criminality should not result in the cr eation of a n ew legal discipline with its own principles a nd rules, but m eans t h e consequent a pplication of traditional yet well proven legal structures. It goes without saying tha t such structures sh ould corresp ond with t h e constitution.
In the following I shall a nalyse h ow criminal law r eacts t o the challen ge of d a ta net crime. Firstly, I shall present som e of the n ew forms of d a ta net crime (2). S econdly I w ill ou tline t he con trov ersial CompuServe-case (3). I sh all then move on to look a t International Crimi nal Law in combination with the Germa n p enal cod e a nd how t his d et ermines the severity of the san ction given (4). I aim to d em onstra t e tha t in a pplying su ch law, a sa tisfactory solution t o the question of a pplica bility can b e found. To conclude (5) the p ossibility of a tra nsnation al or inte rnational criminal Internet law sh all b e discussed. In t he following ther efore, n ot only p enallaw but also p e nal p olitics shall b e discussed.
Appearance Forms of Datanet Crime
All criminal offences can basically be committed via Internet or other datanets, even bodily injury or murder. However, the expression 'datanet criminality' should be limited to those forms of crime which are facilitated by the Internet. The following groups are presently of particular significance (Hilgendorf 2001 ):
• Monitoring of data traffic.
• 'Hacking'.
• Blocking and sabotage of e-mail-addresses, especially those of big companies and authorities.
• Access to or sending of forbidden material (in data form), such as rightist propaganda or pornography.
• Prohibited changing or displacing of data.
• Prohibited copying of d a ta (this includes the infringem ent of copyrights e.g. by file sh a ring).
• The simulation of a false identity. T his may h a ppen w her e a sender uses a false p asswor d, or as a n addressee of a message, e.g . by the simulation of a connection to a bank-comp uter.
• The spreading of false informa tion intentionally, e.g. in order t o ma nipula te stock-market courses.
T h ese eigh t groups a r e not t h e only ones r eleva nt to datan et c riminality, yet sh ould give a n overview of its m ost important forms a t present. In the future, t h e simula tion of a false identity a nd the providing of access to or the sending of false information will b ecome all the m ore importa nt due t o the increasing usage of e-commerc e and electronic ba n king. In my opinion, the blocking and t h e sab ot age of e-mail-addresses which has dr awn immen se public attention over the last few years will gradually loose its importa n ce as counte rmeasures a re develop ed. In t he future, the m ain features of datanet criminality w ill not b e h acking or comp u ter sab otage, b ut w ill b e fra u d, r espectively comp uter fra ud. Faked n ews on the Inte rnet is often iden tified very la te. When Bill C linton gave his first press confer ence on t h e Inte rnet, h e stat ed t h at h e ene rgetically advocated a gr eater a mount of Internet pornography. At first, n ob ody seemed to r egard this statemen t as astonishing (which migh t indicat e a n image problern of the former US President!) . Only later did it b ecom e clear tha t indeed a skilled h acker h ad p ro duced this st at em ent. Alon gside t his t h ere a re further cases con cerning the support of c riminal acts committed by other s, e.g.:
• Provider lia bility a nd
• Liability for placing links to pages with illegal contents.
The discussion about the countering of datanet criminality is still in its early stages, whereas the problern concerning the liability of providers has already attracted much attention. The verdict of the County Court of Munich against the manager of CompuServe Germany is a milestone in this discussion.
The CompuServe Case
The CompuServe case is ranked amongst the most sensational German criminal cases of recent years. On the 28th of May 1998, the former manager of CompuServe Germany was sentenced to two years imprisonment for, amongst other things, spreading paedophilic pornography. The sentence was set on probation of three years. This led to global protests; 'incompetence' and 'presumption' were the mildest of the reproaches made against the presiding Judge. In the USA German beer was poured on the streets, and the questionwas asked, who had actually won the war. The County Court's judgement was annulled on the 17th of November 1999 by the District Court of Munich.
What happened? The accused was the manager of CompuServe Germanythe latter belanging 100% t o CompuServe USA. The company operated and administered connected computer s, which gave Germa n members access to the data banks ofCompuServe USA. In November 1995 the managers ofCompuServe Germany were t old by the Bavaria n criminal prosecution auth orities tha t paedophilic p ornography could b e d eliver ed from the US-American server to Germa n y. Special interest was drawn to five sites with su ch contents. The ma nager immediat ely forwarded this information t o the mother-compa ny in the USA, which then closed down the identified n ewsgr oups. In the course of ev ents, welld esigned n et-control syst ems were procured for the custome rs of CompuServe. Hereaft er the newsgroups wer e opened again.
Nevertheless the Bavarian criminal prosecution a uthorities could download several n ews articles containing paedophilic, sod omitical a nd sadom asochistic p ornogra phy from CompuServe USA. This was p ossible because t he filter-software which CompuServe had applied did not work p erfectly. P aedophilic p ornogra phy is n ot p ermitted in Germany; those who own it or make it accessible to third pa rties must face sever e penalties.
The prosecution acc used CompuServe G erma ny's ma nager of n ot having prev ented access to the illegal contents for Germanusers by n ot a pply ing b etter filter software. H owever , after specialist s from the federal bureau for security in information technology stated in court tha t a complete con trol of the b order-c rossing d ata traffic was not p ossible due to t echnical r easons, b oth the prosecution and the defence sought that the charges b e dropped. It came as quite a surprise when the county court senten ced the accused m a nager to two years imprisonment.
The sentence does, in opposition t o the opinion of ma ny computer magazines, have good argumentation. It is b ased on the idea that CompuServe Germa n y and CompuServe USA form a n economic union and therefore must also be treat ed as such in terms of German criminallaw. This m eans tha t omissions by the US mother compa ny can b e ascribed to theGerma n daughter compa ny. The Bavar-ian judge regarded it as proven that the US Company could have permanently banned the contents of paedophilic pornography from its servers. By not doing this they committed an offence, for which they were liable. Indeed, an offence which can be ascribed to the manager of CompuServe Germany.
The most important points of the judgement state that:
"By closing down the newsgroups, which evidently direct to violent, paedophilic and sodomitical pornography, CompuServe USA could have stopped the usage of this material. In my opinion this statem ent deserves much attention. In principle, it is convincing to ra nk the social values outlined a b ove higher tha n commer cial inter ests. N evertheless many legal details re main una nswer ed, such as to which ext ent the ma n ager is to be held resp on sible for the actions of others who n either closed down n or withdrew the illegal contents. The manager of CompuServe Germany had very little influen ce on the American mother compa ny. Due to his subordinate position it was n ot appropriate to ascribe the m oth er company's omission to the daughter company's manager.
The district court Munich I (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2000, 1051), which found the accused not guilty, explained tha t the actions of the German manager could only qualify as assistance. The acc used had lacked the intention to spread h a rd pornography in the Internet , on the contra ry-he h ad tried hard to ma ke the US mother company close down a nd erase the objected contents. To re nder him guilty of p roviding access t o h a rd pornogra phy would therefore n ot b e correct.
The judgem ent of not guilty was gen er ally m et with approv al among law sp ecialists. It is quite evident h owever, tha t many imp orta nt questions on the indictability of Internet criminality in gen eral a nd the providers' liability rem ain una n swer ed. The CompuServe case d oes p ose special problems since the criminal act was not committed in Germany but on foreign territory-the USA.
The Applicability of German Criminal Law to Illegal Publications in the Internet
The common thread shared by all types of Internet criminality is their internationality. This leads to the question of whether those offences, which are committed abroad but whose effects are felt in Germany fall under German Criminal Law. On the Internet the crossing of national borders is nothing new. This applies to both information which is sent to Germany (e.g. via e-mail) and information, which is drawn from a foreign Internetpage onto German territory. Problematic is to which extent German criminal law can be applied to foreign information, which is received in Germany. Such questions are regulated by 'International Criminal Law'.
A cross border application of domestic criminal law is basically an attack upon the sovereignty of a foreign country, according to principles of Public International Law. The principle of non-interference, according to which the intervention in the affairs of a foreign nation is generally not allowed, is of most relevance. The current discussion con cerning the applicability of German criminal law to the Interne t has shown tha t there exist a large number of quite different p ossible solutions. There is, however , as of yet , no commonly accepted opinion and a uniform practice amon gst prosecuting authorities h as n ot yet come about.
Nevertheless, the German Federal Prosecutor has m ade his intention to apply German criminal law t o the Internet world-wide quite clear. The Federal Court of Germany accepted this view in the Toeben case (Körber 2003) . This would mea n tha t an American, who places rightist material in the Internet on USA territory, renders hirnself liable und er German criminal law, although his action is n ot actually prohibited by US American criminal law.
The starting-point for allocating such criminal liability is the principle of territorial jurisdiction: German criminallaw is valid for crimes carried out within its territorial borders. The principle regarding the location of the crime is laid down in § 9 of the German Criminal Code. This section states that German criminallaw is a pplicable when the p erpetrator acted in Germany or when the effect s of the act a re felt upon German t erritory.
An Unlimited Applicability of German Criminal Law?
German criminal law seems to b e applicable to Internet publications without question when illegal contents can be received in Germany. This would m ean that German criminal law can b e applied t o any publication on the Internet , which falls within the scope of theGerman C riminal Code. However, viewed in the light of Public International Law, this position is ra ther problematic as it effects the sovereignty of indiv idual na tions and thereby breaks the rule of noninterferen ce. Furthermore, from a p olitical point of view, the global a pplication of German criminal law does not seem to b e justifiable. In order to make such an a pplication justifiable, international agreement would be required.
A single sided global application of German criminal law in the Internet may well appear to foreigners as a new version of the old German slogan: "Am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen" ("At the hand of my German brother, the world shall recover"). It must be taken into consideration that other nations, for example, Iran or China, could also try to globally apply their domestic criminal law to the Internet. From this point of view, it appears necessary to limit the applicability of German law (Hilgendorf 1997) .
Limitation of the Rule of General Application?
Some argue that German criminal law is only applicable when the perpetrator, by his act, actually sought effects upon German territory. Hence, this means that the operator of an Internet page would have to intentionally open the illegal data to Germany if he is to become subject to German criminallaw. This limitation, however, does not seem quite practicable: The mere intention to produce effects within Germany is very difficult tobe proven when the perpetrator acted outside German territory.
Other opinions state that German criminallaw should not be applied to acts which a r e not illegal in the country of their p erforma n ce. If rightist propaganda is allowed in the USA, it should not b e p enalised wh en it reach es G ermany v ia t h e Internet. This, h owever would lead to the creation of a legal oasis, w h ere Internet-offen ces can b e ca rried out without the threat of legal sanctions . A third opinion h eld t h erefore looks to the location of t he server itself b efor e deciding upon the app licability of G erma n criminal law. The main problern with this theory is tha t m a ny contents a r e not only kept on one, but on numerous servers.
In all of the theories so fa r put forwa rd, there is the n ecessity for a 'special point of contact ' (or 'genuine link') to G ermany in order to apply G erman law. This means that G erman criminal law should only b e a pplicable to offences which a r e committed outside of Germa ny, if the effects of the offen ce are felt in Germany. In addition, a genuine link to Germany must b e sh own. Regarding d a ta n et offences, such genuine links can b e found in, for example, a n arrest on G erman territory, Ge rman citizen ship, a d omicile in Germany or the simple inte ntion t o have effect s in G ermany. The criteria r equiring a dom estic p oint of contact is b ased upon well proven r egulations in international civil and business law. It is also supported by the principles of Public Interna tional Law.
In the Toeb e n case, the exist en ce of a sp ecial point of contac t or ' genuine link' to Ge rman affairs is a problem. N either was the G erman language used , n or did Toeb e n aim a t a G erma n audie nce. It was only b ecause of the globality of the Internet that Toeb en 's hom epage could b e seen in G erma ny as well as in all other Countries of the world. Therefore, a large pa rt of G erma ny 's criminal law exp erts are sceptical a b ou t the Fed eral Courts decision to apply Germa n criminal law to the Toeb en case. Due to the world-wide growth of the Internet it may be expected that in the future, courts will increasingly have to deal with perpetrators who come from a foreign country or even from another culture. The Internet law, much more than other areas in which law crosses borders, requires the internationalisation of criminallaw (Hilgendorf 2002) .
This poses the question as to how far cultural diversity should be taken into consideration when determining criminal liability. To be subject to a criminal charge, the perpetrator must as a rule know that he has clone wrong. Cases such as those concerning Americans providing Germany with access to rightist propaganda on a US server ( § 130 German Criminal Code) , or of the Scandinavian who intentionally sends data with pornographic contents to Germany ( § 184, I, 4 German Criminal Code) are unproblematic because these perpetrators generally belong to the same culture. Problematic however, is the question of which rules are to be applied when an Internet page, operated in Saudi Arabia but in the German language, calls upon Moslems in Germany to contravene the regulations oftheGerman authorities ( § § 113, 26) . Similarly problematic is a n Internet p age which is op erated in Africa r equesting that Africa ns in Germany perform fe male genital mutilation, and giving de tailed instructions ther eof ( § § 223, 224, 26) . In cases such as these, it can be argued that the offender was n ot able to realise that his doings were wron g .
German criminal law is not completely unprepared for these challenges. Migration streams of recent decades h ave produced la rge multi-cultural gr oups within Germany. The r equirement for the consideration of cultural diver sity is therefore nothing n ew to German criminal law. A s far as actual knowledge of t h e unlawfulness of the act is concerned, which is the most importa nt factor in determining the perpetrator's guilt, cultural diversity can b e easily t a ken into account. The perpetrator should n ot be punished if he did not and could n ot have had su ch knowledge. Yet, r egarding foreigners liv ing in Germany, one may assume tha t they are fully aware of the illegality of their actions, a t least con cerning the b asics of criminallaw. One practical example is incest, which is forbidde n in Germany, however not in ma n y Southern European countries; there incest generally seems to be socially accepted.
For perpetrators acting v ia Internet however, it can b e assumed that they do n ot know exactly w ha t constitutes a crime in the state with which they are dealing. This is particularly so w hen the person in question h as never left his or her home cultural area. Someone who, for example, lives in a country in which several ma rriages a r e common and advises his n ephew in Germany to take a second woman beside his wife will n ot render hirnself liable under German law, although bigamy is a criminal offence under § 172 oftheGerma n Criminal Code.
The case of female genital mutilation might be v iewed differently. Such actions infringe the fundamental human right of personal integrity. In this case, knowledge of the illegality of the act can be assumed, even if the perpetr ator is a foreigner. The same goes for an attempt of the offence as well. The operator of such a homepage in an African country could therefore be liable under German criminal law , if such an offence is committed in Germany. Questions such as these have, however, not yet appeared before the German courts.
Therefore, one can say that criminal law is indeed able to take cultural diversity into consideration. In this respect 'Intercultural Criminal Law' already exists.
A Transnational Criminal Law For the Internet?
As regards those acts which exert a negative effect within a state's territory, but which escape national criminal liability owing to the absence of the earlier mentioned 'link', a different problern arises. If such acts are not criminal under the domestic law of the country where they were originally performed, it seems to be appropriate to aim towards an intercultural and transnational criminal law. This ftmction cannot be assumed by the Internet's international code of behav iour, so-called 'Netiquette'.
The present development of Public International Law and the emergence of the Interna tional C riminal Court Statute, sh ow that the idea of a n effective tra nsnational Interne t criminal law is not unthinkable. It is, of course, not to be exp ected t h at all st a tes would accep t such a n International C riminal Law for the Internet, n or r egard it n ecessar y to bring such law into existen ce. M oreover , t h e con tents of a criminal law for the Internet a r e still t o be d efined. Before a solution can be found, political consider a tions a r e n ecessar y a n d the ideas of all involved must be examined.
It would not b e right t obasesuch a n Inte rnet law solely on the c ultural values held by Weste rn Europ e a nd N orth America. This is of pa rticula r importa n ce w h en t he b asis is n ot clear , b ut hidde n by such vague terms as "huma n rights" or "justice". T his does not m ean tha t t h e imp or tan ce of huma n rights should b e forgotten; it m erely means that c ulturally varying points of view sh ould b e con sidered. T he common r eproach against 'western cultural imperialism ' rings true with regard to the Internet.
The following a r gument is possibly t h e one pointing us in the right direction. Gen erally sp eaking, criminallaw h as t h e task of securing those values which the resp ective societ y thinks a re the most importa nt. These values b ecom e legal. W h en talking of the construction of a n Inte rna tional C riminal Law, only t h ose values can be ta ken into account , which are of universal interest . In p ractical terms, these a r e values which are b ased directly upon human n ature, such asdomestic criminal law regulations. States must, however apply such domestic regulations carefully, with regard for the sovereignty of other nations.
There is, as well as true International Criminal Law and purely national criminallaw for the Internet, a third way to cope legally with the criminality on the Internet. So called 'universal jurisdiction' allows states to apply their own domestic criminal law worldwide, when certain criteria (which are defined by public internationallaw) are met.
Universal jurisdiction concerning Internet publications is possible only in limited cases. As far as German (or any other national) law is concerned, this would mean that only severe Internet crimes fall within the scope of national criminal law, irrespective of where in the world they were committed. This is already the practice as regards paedophilic and violent pornography ( compare § 6 German criminal code). Any attempt, however, to enlarge the number of offences which fall under a single state's criminal law must be met with caution. If countries with deep rooted democratic traditions, such as the USA, regard the right to freedom of speech so highly, that they fail to punish rightist propaganda, that is their domestic business. It is not any single other nation's job (and certainly not Ge rmany's) t o try a nd counter this by expanding its d omestic jurisdiction to cover the entire Interne t. If n ational criminal law is to b e expanded worldwide, this sh ould be based on internation al agr eements.
In effect , this means tha t the problern of compute r-related crime on the Intern et cannot, on a world-wide scale, b e solved by criminal law alon e.
